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OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY IN A SMALL OPEN
ECONOMY UNDER SEGMENTED ASSET MARKETS AND
STICKY PRICES
Ruy Lama Juan Pablo Medina
UCLA Banco Central de Chile
Resumen
Este trabajo estudia la política monetaria optima en un modelo de dos sectores para un economía
pequeña con mercados financieros segmentados y precios rígidos. Resolvemos el problema de
Ramsey bajo completa credibilidad y caracterizamos la política monetaria óptima en una versión del
modelo calibrada para Chile. Las principales contribuciones de este trabajo son dos. Primero, bajo la
política óptima la volatilidad de la inflación no transable es casi cero. Segundo, estabilizar la inflación
no transable es una decisión óptima sin importar la estructura financiera de la economía pequeña.
Incluso para un nivel moderado de rigidez de precios, implementar una política monetaria que mitiga
la segmentación de mercados es altamente distorsionante. Este último resultado sugiere que las
imperfecciones financieras debieran ser corregidas con otros instrumentos.
Abstract
This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a two-sector small open economy model under
segmented asset markets and sticky prices. We solve the Ramsey problem under full commitment, and
characterize the optimal monetary policy in a version of the model calibrated to the Chilean economy.
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, under the optimal policy the volatility of non-
tradable inflation is near zero. Second, stabilizing non-tradable inflation is optimal regardless of the
financial structure of the small open economy. Even for a moderate degree of price stickiness,
implementing a monetary policy that mitigates asset market segmentation is highly distortionary. This
last result suggests that policymakers should resort to other instruments in order to correct financial
imperfections.
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The last two decades have been marked by drastic changes in the way monetary policy is
conducted. An increasing number of central banks around the world are independent1,
have adopted price stability as the main goal, and have switched to a °oating exchange
rate regime. The consensus among policymakers is that a low and stable in°ation rate
is a necessary condition for macroeconomic stability and economic growth2. Figure 1
illustrates this point and shows how in°ation has converged to a single digit along the
1990s in both developing and developed economies. Although monetary authorities in
both groups of countries share a price stability goal, the economic environment in which
the monetary policy is implemented is completely di®erent. In particular, developing
countries face shallow ¯nancial markets that prevent e±cient consumption and saving
decisions. Figure 2, which compares the ratio of banking deposits to GDP in developing
and developed countries, makes this point clear. This measure of ¯nancial depth indi-
cates that households and ¯rms in developing countries have limited access to ¯nancial
instruments to carry out e±cient intertemporal decisions.
The magnitude of ¯nancial imperfections in emerging market economies has triggered
an intense debate among academics and policymakers about the role of monetary policy
in this environment3. If households cannot smooth consumption over time, one possible
1By independent we mean that the monetary authority is not subordinate to the ¯scal authority.
2According to the testimony of Alan Greenspan before the Senate Banking Committee on July 2004
: "For twenty-¯ve years, the Federal Reserve has worked to reestablish price stability on a sustained
basis. An environment of price stability allows households and businesses to make decisions that best
promote the longer-term growth of our economy and with it our nation's continuing prosperity". On
the other hand, the Central Bank of Chile described their policy goals in the Monetary Policy Report
of May 2004: "The main purpose of the Central Bank of Chile's monetary policy is to keep in°ation
low and stable, targeted at a range of 2% to 4% per annum, centered on 3%. Controlling in°ation
is the means by which monetary policy contributes to the population's welfare. Low, stable in°ation
improves economic performance and growth, while preventing the erosion of personal income". Both
quotes re°ect the consensus among policymakers about the importance of price stability in promoting
economic e±ciency and growth.
3For instance, C¶ espedes et al. (2004) and Gertler et al. (2003) discuss whether it is optimal for
the monetary authority to stabilize the exchange rate in order to insure ¯rms that have liabilities
1solution to correct this distortion is to implement a monetary policy that increases
consumption in bad states of nature a reduced it in good states of nature. Such a policy
may improve the intertemporal allocation of households excluded from ¯nancial markets.
A challenge for the literature of monetary policy in open economies is to study the design
of optimal monetary policy in a model that captures the lack of ¯nancial development.
In particular, it is important to draw clear prescriptions for policymaking in developing
countries: Is price stability an optimal policy criterion for a developing small open
economy? Is there a role for monetary policy to correct ¯nancial imperfections? In
this paper we consider these questions in the framework of a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model.
In the model economy there are two sectors: tradable and non-tradable. The ¯rms in
the tradable sector are perfectly competitive and can adjust their prices freely. On the
other hand, ¯rms in the non-tradable sector are monopolistically competitive and display
price stickiness. Sticky prices are modeled as a quadratic adjustment cost for ¯rms µ a la
Rotemberg(1982) 4. This cost induces sluggishness in the price level and generates a real
e®ect for monetary injections. We model ¯nancial imperfections in developing countries
as an asset market segmentation problem. In this environment, only a fraction of the
population has access to international capital markets. The households that are excluded
from ¯nancial markets can only save through the accumulation of real money balances.
Even though this assumption cannot capture all types of ¯nancial imperfections present
in developing countries, it is a tractable way to model the lack of ¯nancial assets for a
denominated in foreign currency. Both authors ¯nd that a ¯xed exchange rate is a suboptimal policy
that exacerbates the negative e®ects of an external shock. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2003), in
a di®erent framework, study how monetary policy should be designed in order to provide insurance
incentives to households and ¯rms against "sudden stops" (i.e. sudden capital out°ows from emerging
market economies). They propose a monetary regime in which the private sector may have an incentive
to accumulate foreign assets to better deal with sudden stops.
4Rotemberg (1982) mentions two reasons why price changes might be costly. First, there is the
physical cost of changing posted prices (menu costs). Second, the costs are related to the negative
e®ects on reputation when ¯rms frequently change their prices.
2large segment of the population 5.
We follow Ramsey (1927) and Lucas and Stokey (1983) in characterizing the optimal
monetary policy. In this approach, the Ramsey planner chooses an allocation that
maximizes the household's welfare subject to the resource constraints of the economy and
additional constraints that capture the equilibrium reactions by ¯rms and households
to monetary policy6. In addition, we assume that the monetary authority implements
the policy under full commitment. This assumption implies that monetary policy is
completely credible, and prevents any in°ation bias problem in the implementation of
the optimal policy.
We calibrate the parameters of the model to the Chilean economy. We chose this
country as a benchmark case, since Chile is the ¯rst emerging market economy to imple-
ment an in°ation targeting scheme7. The central bank has gained substantial credibility
in recent years due to its good reputation in controlling the in°ation rate. This is consis-
tent with the lack of in°ation bias in the model. Moreover, Chile is a developing country
that, though has implemented several structural reforms since the 1970s, displays under-
developed ¯nancial markets and price indexation in the goods markets. Both features
are taken into account in the model by assuming asset market segmentation and sticky
prices.
The contributions of the paper are twofold. First, the optimal policy largely stabilizes
the price of non-tradable goods. A full stabilization of the non-tradable price would be
the prescription to completely undo sticky prices8. However, since there are additional
5Campbell and Mankiw (1989) show empirical evidence that around 50 percent of households in the
United States base their consumption decisions on current income, which is consistent with the hypoth-
esis of segmented asset markets. For emerging economies, where ¯nancial markets are underdeveloped,
it is reasonable to assume that asset market segmentation is at least as severe as in the United States.
6This is the primal approach of the Ramsey problem.
7Under this framework, the monetary authority announces numerical targets for the in°ation rate,
and there is a commitment to achieve these targets. Moreover, the central bank is accountable for the
policies implemented and there is an increased transparency in the communication of their plans and
objectives with the public.
8A complete stabilization of the price of non-tradable goods eliminates the distortion associated with
3distortions in the model such as monopolistic competition, monetary transactions costs
and asset market segmentation, the optimal monetary policy deviates from full price
stability in order to minimize the impact of these other frictions on the household's
welfare. For a plausible calibration of the distortions mentioned above, we found that
the quantitative deviation from price stability is negligible.
Second, we ¯nd that a stable non-tradable in°ation rate is optimal for any degree
of asset market segmentation. In the model there is a tradeo® between undoing the
asset market segmentation and sticky price distortions. If the objective is to undo the
sticky price distortion, then the monetary policy should be pro-cyclical9 when there are
productivity shocks in the non-tradable sector. To gain intuition about the procyclicality
of the monetary policy we can think about the case when there is an increase in the
productivity of the non-tradable sector. The consequence of this productivity shock is
an expansion of the non-tradable output and a decrease of the price level in that sector.
In order to prevent a decline of the price of non-tradable goods, and hence the resource
cost associated with this contraction, it is necessary to stimulate the aggregate demand
with a monetary injection. Thereby, a pro-cyclical policy that completely stabilizes the
price level will undo the distortion associated to sticky prices.
On the other hand, if the goal is to correct the asset market segmentation distortion,
the monetary policy should be counter-cyclical. The key element to understand is the
wedge that monetary transaction costs generate. By injecting money in bad states of
nature, or when the output is low, the transaction costs are reduced. A lower transaction
cost decreases the e®ective price of consumption, and makes it possible for households
to increase their consumption when they are a®ected by a negative shock. In this way, a
counter-cyclical policy improves the intertemporal allocation for those households who
sticky prices. Woodford (2001) shows that in a model economy with sticky prices, price stability is the
welfare-maximizing policy. Goodfriend and King (2001) ¯nd that price stability is the optimal policy.
They call this a neutral policy, since it keeps output at the potential level, de¯ned as the outcome of
an imperfectly competitive real business cycle model.
9Ireland (1996) derives the same result.
4do not participate in the asset markets.
When we calibrate the model economy for plausible values of asset market segmenta-
tion and price stickiness we ¯nd that the tradeo® between correcting these distortions is
resolved in favor of undoing price stickiness. Hence, the optimal monetary policy largely
stabilizes °uctuations in the non-tradable price. This suggests that correcting the asset
market segmentation with monetary policy is highly distortionary. If a monetary author-
ity wants to improve the intertemporal allocation of the households without access to
¯nancial markets, it must generate a high volatility in the price of non-tradable goods.
Under sticky prices, this volatility generates a deadweight loss in the non-tradable sector
that is welfare reducing. For di®erent values of asset market segmentation, this result
holds and the optimal monetary policy induces a low volatility of the non-tradable price.
This paper is related to several studies about optimal monetary policy. In a closed
economy with °exible prices and perfect competition, Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari
et al (1991) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) followed the Ramsey approach to characterize
the optimal monetary policy. They have proven that in this environment the optimal
monetary policy should be to set the nominal interest rate to zero (i.e. Friedman's
rule). This theoretical result recently has been challenged in models that incorporate
monopolistic competition and sticky prices. Khan et al.(2003), Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe
(2004) and Siu (2004) ¯nd that when the adjustment of prices implies a cost in terms
of resources, the Friedman rule is no longer an optimal policy prescription in a closed
economy. Nevertheless, when nominal rigidities are present, the monetary policy should
approximately stabilize the price level. The presence of monopolistic competition and
money distortion induce a deviation from full price stability, however the quantitative
magnitude of this departure is minor10.
10Ad~ ao et al. (2003) show that, in general, in an environment with sticky prices, a cash-in-advance
constraint and monopolistic competition it is not optimal to undo the sticky price distortion. They do
not, however, evaluate quantitatively how much the allocation under the optimal policy di®ers from the
°exible price allocation.
5In an open economy setting ,there is an extensive literature about monetary pol-
icy under monopolistic competition and sticky prices. However, the Ramsey approach
has not been broadly used as in closed economy models11. For the case of small open
economy model with sticky prices, Gal¶ ³ and Monacelli (2003) derive the optimal policy
but assuming a cashless economy and removing the monopolistic power distortion with
an employment subsidy. They ¯nd that the optimal policy fully stabilizes the domes-
tic price level. This policy reproduces the °exible price allocation and maximizes the
household's welfare.
Asset market segmentation is another friction that has been recently introduced into
dynamic general equilibrium monetary models12. Lahiri et al. (2004) characterize the
optimal policy in a small open economy with °exible prices and segmented asset markets.
In their model, the optimal monetary policy is a state contingent rule aimed to provide
insurance to the agents excluded from asset markets. This policy achieves the ¯rst-best
allocation and completely undo the asset market segmentation problem in the model
economy.
The goal of this paper is to characterize the interaction between sticky prices and
asset market segmentation in the design of the optimal monetary policy in a small open
economy. In principle, both frictions are present in developing countries, and it is not
evident how a monetary policy should deal simultaneously with these distortions. As
opposed to most of the open economy macroeconomics literature, we solve the Ramsey
problem to characterize the optimal monetary policy in this environment. This approach
makes it possible to analyze from a general equilibrium perspective how monetary policy
should be implemented to correct multiple distortions in an economy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the small
11Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003) solve the Ramsey problem for a small open economy in a °exible
price environment. Faia and Monacelli (2004) follow the same approach in a two-country model with
sticky prices and monopolistic competition.
12See Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotemberg (1984), Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) and Alvarez et al.
(2002).
6open economy model. Section 3 describes the Ramsey problem under full commitment.
Section 4 discusses the calibration strategy, and analyzes the quantitative results of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we describe a simple in¯nite-horizon production economy with sticky
prices and segmented asset markets. This economy consists of two types of households:
traders and non-traders. The former type of agent has access to ¯nancial markets while
the latter one does not participate in them. The non-traders can only save through the
accumulation of real money balances. To simplify the model, we suppose that household
type (i.e., traders and non-traders) is ¯xed over time and that the fraction of households
participating in the ¯nancial market denotes the degree of asset market segmentation in
the economy.
The production side of the model has two sectors: tradable and non-tradable. The
tradable good sector exhibits °exible prices and takes international prices as given. In
constrast, the non-tradable sector displays monopolistic competition and sticky prices,
which are modelled as a quadratic adjustment cost µ a la Rotemberg. The introduction
of money in this model is motivated as a device to reduce household's transaction costs.
The ¯scal policy is characterized by a balanced budget and the government expenditure
is ¯nanced with lump sum taxes levied on both types of households. Money injections
are engineered in the ¯nancial markets, so the traders are the only ones who absorb
them. The model has three types of exogenous °uctuations: productivity shocks in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors, and government expenditure shocks.
72.1 Households
The households decide a sequence of tradable and non-tradable consumption and labor













where cT, cN, and l denote tradable consumption, non-tradable consumption, and
labor supply, respectively. ¯ is a subjective discount factor and E0 denotes the expec-
tation operator conditional on the information in period 0. The index i = tr stands for
allocations for trader households while i = nt is the same but for non-trader households.
The two types of households share the same preferences despite having di®erent access
to ¯nancial markets.
The role of money is to facilitate consumption purchases. In particular, we assume
that consumption of both types of goods are subject to a proportional transaction cost,








where pT and pN are the prices of tradable and nontradable goods, respectively. M(i)
is the nominal money holdings of type i household.
2.1.1 Traders
The fraction of traders in the economy is denoted by ¸. As traders, they have access to
two other types of ¯nancial assets besides money. They can trade domestic one-period
contingent bonds and international one-period non-contingent bonds. The domestic
bond delivers one unit of domestic currency in the next period in some particular state.
8The international bond delivers one unit of foreign currency in the next period in each
state of nature. Consequently, the trader's budget constraint is described by:
(1 + s(vt(tr)))(pT
t cT
t (tr) + pN
t cN
t (tr)) + Et[qt;t+1dt+1(tr)]
+etb¤
















We explain each of the terms in order. On the left-hand side of the equation, the
¯rst term is the expenditure on tradable and nontradable consumption goods including
transaction costs. The second one, is the expenditure on domestic contingent bonds.
dt+1(tr) is the units of these bonds bought by the trader and qt;t+1 is the period t price of
these securities normalized by the probability of the occurrence of each state of nature.
The trader also buys b¤
t(tr) units of international non-contingent bonds where et de-
notes the nominal exchange rate. The fourth term is the money holdings that the trader
chooses to carry over from t to t+1. On the right-hand side of the equation we include
the sources of income. The ¯rst term is the labor income. Wt is the nominal wage rate
and lt(tr) is the amount of labor supplied. dt(tr) is the quantity of contingent bonds
held by the trader from the previous period that pays at the state in current period t.
The third term on the right-hand side is the return on non-contingent international bond
holding where R¤
t¡1 is the gross interest rate on this bond in terms of foreign currency.
Mt¡1(tr) is the money holdings from the last period and ¦t is the nominal pro¯ts from
¯rms13. Xt is the per capita money injections which are carried out in the ¯nancial
markets and for that reason, are only absorbed by traders. Due to the fact that the size
of traders in the economy is ¸, ¦=¸ and X=¸ are the dividends and money injections per
13Since traders participate in ¯nancial markets, they will hold shares of the ¯rms. The fact that ¯rms
in the non-tradable sector have market power implies that these pro¯ts will be strictly positive.
9trader. T is the lump sum taxes which are designed to ¯nance government expenditures
and is the same across all type of households.14 The last term is included to avoid a
wealth di®erence between traders and nontraders in the steady state. S is the subsidy,
in terms of nontradable goods, that each non-trader receives which is ¯nanced with a
tax on trader households15.
The problem for the traders is to maximize their utility subject to their budget con-
straint, initial asset holdings (M¡1(tr);d0(tr);b¤























h(vt(tr)) = 1 + s(vt(tr)) + s
0(vt(tr))vt(tr)
14In other words, Tt is the per capita lump sum tax charged to ¯nance the government expenditure
in period t.
15Since traders have more options in terms of assets and receive the ¯rms dividends, they are wealthier
than nontraders. This tax on the traders is a subsidy to the nontraders that prevents wealth di®erences



































Equation (2) determines the relative demand of tradable and nontradable goods by
the traders as a function of the relative price of tradable goods (pT=pN). The traders'
labor supply is speci¯ed by (3) which equates the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and tradable consumption with the real wage in terms of tradable goods. Since
the transaction cost a®ects the e®ective price of consumption goods, it introduces a
wedge (h(vt(tr)) in the labor supply decision16.
Equations (4), (5), and (6) de¯ne indirectly a money demand function, an interest
parity condition, and the market nominal interest rate. To see them clearly, we have to




Combining this last expression with (4) implies Rt(1¡s0(vt(tr))(vt(tr))2) = 1. Using
the de¯nition of velocity and writing pTcT
t (tr) + pN
t cN







16The term (h(vt(tr)) is standard in models with transaction costs. This wedge can be interpreted
as an implicit consumption tax.
17In this case pt denotes the aggregate price level and ct(tr) is the composite consumption of traders.
11where G(¢) is de¯ned as G(v) = s0(v)v2. Also, combining the expression of the gross
















The size of non-trader households in the economy is (1 ¡ ¸). This type of household
does not have access to ¯nancial markets and can only use money holdings to transfer
resources across time. Their labor supply is a perfect substitute of traders labor supply
and therefore they recieve the same nominal wage rate Wt. In the same way as traders,
they pay Tt in lump sum taxes. As discussed before, they also receive a subsidy S in
terms of non-tradable goods such that the wealth di®erence with traders disappears in
the steady state. These elements imply the following budget constraint for non-traders:
(1 + s(vt(nt)))(pT
t cT
t (nt) + pN
t cN
t (nt)) + Mt(nt) =
Wtlt(nt) + Mt¡1(nt) ¡ Tt + pN
t S
(7)
The ¯rst-order conditions obtained by maximizing the non-traders utility function


































Equations (8), (9), and (10) are equivalent to the equations (2), (3), and (4) derived
for the traders. Speci¯cally, (8) determines the relative consumption of tradable vis-µ a-
vis non-tradable goods for the non-traders as a function of the relative price of tradable
goods. (9) is the labor supply of nontraders and (4) is their implicit money demand.
However, since these households do not participate in the asset markets, the implicit
money demand does not depend on the nominal interest rate18.
2.2 Firms in the Tradable Sector
The ¯rms in the tradable sector behave competitively and have a constant returns to
scale technology that uses labor and nontradable goods as inputs. In particular, the










t denotes the productivity level displayed in this sector. This variable follows
an exogenous stochastic process. lT and N are the amount of labor and ¯nal non-
tradable goods used as inputs, respectively. Hence, the ¯rms in the tradable sector solve
























18This is is due to the fact that in absence of asset markets, the intertemporal rate of substitution is










(12) and (13) determine the labor and non-tradable inputs demanded by ¯rms.
2.3 Firms in the Non-tradable Sector
There are two types of ¯rms in the non-tradable sector: retailers and intermediate good
producers. The latter use labor to produce a di®erentiated good while the former com-
bine these intermediate inputs to produce a ¯nal good consumed by the households.
2.3.1 Retailers
Retailers create units of nontradable ¯nal goods according to a constant elasticity of
substitution aggregator of a continuum of nontradable intermediate goods which are
indexed along the unit interval j 2 [0;1]. Speci¯cally, retailers produce yN
t units of














Then the retailers allocate their demands for non-tradable intermediate good yN
t (j)













subject to the constraint (14). The ¯rst-order condition of the problem leads to
intermediate input demands with constant elasticity:
y
N
























2.3.2 Intermediate Good Producers
The producers of non-tradable intermediate inputs are assumed to be monopolistic com-
petitors and face a cost of adjusting their prices. In particular, we follow Rotemberg
(1982) and consider quadratic costs of price adjustment. This creates a sluggish price
adjustment by assuming that the intermediate producer of variety j faces a resource











The parameter · measures the degree of price stickiness present in the non-tradable
sector. The higher · is, the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices in this










t (j) is the labor utilized by this intermediate producer who pays a nominal
wage rate Wt. zN
t is the productivity level of the nontradable sector, which follows an
exogenous stochastic process and it is assumed the same for all ¯rms. Therefore, the
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The adjustment cost in prices generates an intertemporal link in the optimal decisions
of intermediate producers since changes in prices in the current period will a®ect the cost
of adjusting them in the next period. Formally, the intermediate producer of variety j
will chose a sequence of prices given the demand function (15), the production function,
the wage rate, the initial price (pN
¡1) and productivity level, maximizing the expected
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where q0;t is the price of a nominal contingent security in period 0 that delivers one
unit of domestic currency in period t in some particular state normalized by the proba-
bility of occurrence. The prices of the securities can be constructed recursively using ini-
tially the one period contingent bonds which are priced by the traders (q0;t = qt¡1;tq0;t¡1).


























































We will focus on a symmetric equilibrium for the non-tradable intermediate input









t (j) for all j 2 [0;1]. This symmetry translates into the following version of the
























t¡1 is the gross in°ation rate of non-tradable goods and mct denotes
the real marginal cost of producing non-tradable intermediate goods. Due to the fact
that intermediate good producers have a constant returns to scale technology, their







Finally, using the symmetry across intermediate good producers and the technology










The only distortionary policy instrument available is the nominal interest rate. We
abstract from other types of proportional income taxes. Also, government debt is not
considered as a way to ¯nance the government expenditures. Hence, we assume that the









t + Xt ¡ Tt (22)
In this equation, Tt is the per capita lump sum taxes charged to households to ¯-
nance current government expenditure. Another feature of this government is that ¯scal
17purchases (gN
t ) consist only of non-tradable goods. This variable will follow a stochastic
exogenous process.20





t¡1 + Xt (23)
where Xt denotes per capita money injections in the ¯nancial market.
2.5 International Transactions




t = et (24)
Without loss of generality, we will assume that the foreign price remains constant
and equal to one.
In the standard small open economy model the international interest rate is given
and international bonds follow a unit root process21. This feature prevents the imple-
mentation of log-linearization techniques. The unit root implies that deviations from the
steady state are permanent, while the log-linearization procedure is accurate only around
the steady state. Consequently, in the standard model, log-linearization techniques are
unreliable. To overcome this problem, Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003) propose four
di®erent methods to induce stationarity in the international bond. In this model, we
20This is done due to the lack of good information regarding nontradable and tradable ¯scal ex-
penditure in Chile. However, the relevance of tradable government expenditure is low in overall ¯scal
expenditure in Chile. Also, simulations not reported here emphasize the small impact of tradable ¯scal
expenditures since the ¯nancial integration of a small open economy allows the agents to hedge against
this type of shock.
21See Scmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2003).
18introduce one of them: an upward-sloping supply of funds. This friction in the interna-
tional ¯nancial markets induces an interest rate premium that is increasing in the total
international debt of the economy.22 The functional form we assume for the upward












t is the aggregate net foreign assets expressed in foreign currency. This equation has
two components. The ¯rst one is the steady state value for the gross international interest
rate, which is equal to the inverse of the subjective discount factor of households23. The
second one is the risk premium, which depends on the deviation of the foreign debt from
its steady state value (B¤). This last value is calibrated to be consistent with the steady
state value of net exports over total output.
2.6 Market Clearing Conditions
In each period there are markets for the two type of goods, labor, money, domestic and
foreign bonds. The market clearing condition for the labor market is:





We will assume that transaction costs are deadweight losses in the nontradable sector.
Also, recalling that Nt is the nontradable input in the tradable sector and ·(¼N
t ¡1)2=2
is the amount of resources used in adjusting prices in that sector, we obtain the equilib-
rium condition for non-tradable goods:
22As is common in small open economy models that describe developing countries, we consider the
case where the country as a whole is a net debtor. Hence, log-linearization around the steady state will
make this upward sloping supply of funds operative.
23This condition is derived from the steady state of the Euler equation for foreign bonds (5).
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The market clearing condition in the tradable sector can be expressed as:
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t stands for the aggregate net foreign assets held by this economy. Since







Because trader households are identical, in equilibrium there is no borrowing or
lending in domestic contingent bonds. This implies:
dt(tr) = 0 (30)
Finally, the equilibrium condition in the money market is given by:
M
s
t = ¸Mt(tr) + (1 ¡ ¸)Mt(nt) (31)
2.7 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy is a set of (i) Prices: fet, pT
t , pN
t , qt;t+1, Wt, R¤
t, mctg,
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In this section, we characterize the approach applied to ¯nd the optimal monetary pol-
icy. Our analysis of optimal policy is in the tradition of Ramsey (1927) and draws
heavily on modern literature of optimal policy in dynamic economies. We focus on the
conditions that describe optimal allocations under full commitment of monetary policy.
This approach describes the competitive equilibrium in a primal form and leads to a
characterization of the optimal allocations. It recasts all the prices and policy instru-
ments in terms of allocations. Our methodology is built on the work of Khan et al.
(2003) and Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2004), where they adapt the approach of Stokey
and Lucas (1983) to include monopolistic competition and sticky prices in addition to
monetary distortions. Unlike these papers, we consider a small open economy and we
include another friction: asset market segmentation.
As we saw in the last section, the set of conditions that characterize a competi-
tive equilibrium given a policy include too many equations. Fortunately, we can com-
bine these equations to have a compact set of constraints de¯ning the market equilib-
rium. The objective of the monetary authority is to achieve an allocation that yields
the highest weighted average of the utilities of households. In particular, the Ramsey






















21subject to the set of equilibrium conditions explained below. Combining (2) and
(8) with (13) we get expressions that relate the marginal rate of substitution between
non-tradable and tradable consumption for both types of households with the marginal





















Likewise, we can obtain equations that link the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and tradable consumption for households with the marginal productivity of labor





















Replacing the de¯nition of the non-tradable in°ation (¼N
t = pN
t =pN




























Also, using (5), (24) and (25) we can derive an expectational equation governing the
















The Phillips curve derived in (19) can be rearranged to eliminate qt;t+1 and mct. We


































In the market-clearing condition for the non-tradable sector (27) we can substitute
the de¯nition of the relative price of tradable goods using (2) and (8). Also, combining
(11) and (26), we can express the total non-tradable production as function of the total
labor supplied and the labor used in the tradable sector. These replacements translate
into the following resource constraint:
¸cN
t (tr) + (1 ¡ ¸)cN
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Using the law of one price in the tradable sector (24), we can rewrite the market-
clearing condition in the tradable sector as:
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Since we have two types of households we need to keep track of one of the household
budget constraints. We use the budget constraint of the non-traders (7). We normalize
it in terms of non-tradable goods and using (8), the de¯nition of velocity of non-traders,
and the fact that in equilibrium Tt = pN
t gN
t , we obtain:































The previous constraints can be classi¯ed in three groups. (32), (33), (34), (35)
and (40) are intratemporal conditions in the sense that they only include only variables
dated at t. (41) and (42) which are not intratemporal but predetermined equations
because they include variables dated at t and t¡1. Finally, (36), (37), (38) and (39) are
expectational equations, meaning that they contain expectation of the variables at t+1
based on information at t. This observation is important since we cannot collapse the
primal form of the competitive equilibrium into a unique intertemporal implementability
condition in period 0 and a set of intratemporal conditions.
As identi¯ed by Aiyagari et al.(2003), a real economy without contingent government
debt includes forward-looking constraints that must be satis¯ed each period. In our
framework, money distortions and sticky prices also imply forward-looking constraints
that must hold every period: the Phillips curve and the implicit money demands. The
expectations-augmented Philips curve posits a constrain to the in°ation path and it can-
not be written as a single constraint in period 0 or as an intratemporal condition. The
24implicit money demand restricts the intertemporal behavior of money velocity. Further-
more, asset market segmentation implies the additional presence of equations that de¯ne
the money demand of non-traders and their budget constraint. The last one contains
a intertemporal link given by the fact that the only asset that non-traders may use to
smooth consumption is money holdings.
The Ramsey problem described is akin to the framework used by Marcet and Ma-
rimon (1999) in their analysis of recursive contracts. Their methodology implies that
optimal problems with forward-looking constraints call for a new state variable to be
added to the state space to characterize the time-invariant optimal policy rule. In our
monetary problem, these variables are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the ex-
pectational equations (36)-(39). To see this, it is possible to construct the Lagrangian
associated with the optimal problem and rearrange the terms into a recursive saddle
point functional equation. We relegate this derivation to appendix A.
De¯ning ¹1 - ¹11 as the Lagrange multipliers associated with equations (32) - (42),




vt(nt), ¹5;t, ¹6;t, ¹7;t, ¹8;t]0. We denote yt as the vector of all other endogenous variables,
i.e., yt = [cT
t (tr), cN
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Then the ¯rst order conditions that characterize the optimal policy can be represented
as a system of equations of the form:
G(xt;xt¡1;yt;zt) = 0
Et [H(xt+1;xt;xt¡1;yt+1;yt;zt+1;zt)] = 0
25The ¯rst set is formed by deterministic equations, while the second one consists
of expectational equations. The computational approach involves two steps. First, we
compute the steady state which is given by G(x;x;y;z) = 0 and H(x;x;x;y;y;z;z) = 0.
Second, we log-linearize the above system of equations and calculate the local dynamic
behavior of endogenous variables given a speci¯ed law of motion for exogenous °uctu-
ations. Additionally, when we compute the dynamics of the monetary regimes, such
as non-tradable in°ation targeting, money peg, and exchange rate peg, we consider the
same steady state as the one calcluated for the optimal policy. In these last cases, the
dynamics are estimated only by log-linearizing equations (32) - (42) and the speci¯c rule
of a monetary regime.
4 Dynamics under the Optimal Policy
In this section, we show the numerical results of the model. First, we explain the
calibration strategy for the model economy. Then, we describe the dynamics of the
optimal monetary policy, and compare them with alternative monetary regimes. We
show the impulse responses and the second moments of the simulated economy. Finally,
we conduct a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the results.
4.1 Calibration
The parameters of the model are chosen to match some features of the Chilean economy
and some of them are taken from other studies in the literature of open economies. The
time unit is one quarter. We adopt a logarithmic utility function:
u(c;l) = lnc + Ã log(1 ¡ l) (43)










We chose a preference weight on leisure consistent with a steady state labor supply
of 0.22. For the intratemporal elasticity of substitution 1=(1¡¹) we rely on the estima-
tion of Gonzales-Rozada and Neumeyer (2003) for Argentina and set its value to 0.524.
To the best of our knowledge there are no empirical estimates of the preference weights
between tradable and nontradable goods. Thus, we follow Rebelo and V¶ egh (1995) and
assume that µ is equal to 0.5.












We set the labor weight in the production function to ®T = 0:4. This parameter value
is taken from Guajardo (2003) and is consistent with the labor share of the tradable
sector in Chile. For the elasticity of substitution between labor and the intermediate
nontradable input there are no estimates for the Chilean economy. We assume Á = 1:5,
which is the value generally used in the international business cycle literature for the
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign inputs in the production func-
tion.25 Based on Bergoeing and Piguillem (2003) we set " = 6, which implies a steady
state markup of 20 percent.
We assume the same transaction costs speci¯cation as Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe
24We assume that this preference parameter is similar to the one for the Chilean economy.
25See Chari et al. (2002)
27(2004):






One particular feature of this transaction technology is that it exhibits a satiation
point of real money balances. This is necessary in order to obtain well-de¯ned money
demand at the Friedman rule (ie. zero nominal interest rate). With a zero nominal
interest rate, transaction costs are nil and the equilibrium consumption velocity is equal
to v =
p
»=!. To calibrate the parameters of the transaction costs technology, we es-













For the consumption velocity we use the ratio of nominal private consumption to
M1. For the estimation, we consider the nominal interest rate on deposits between 90
days and one year. The OLS parameter estimates of equation (47) are ! = 0:06 and
» = 0:17.27
To calibrate the quadratic adjustment cost of prices we follow Gal¶ ³ and Gertler (1999)
and estimate the log-linearized version of the expectational augmented Phillips curve as-
suming zero in°ation in the steady state:
26It is not possible to obtain empirical estimates of these parameters for each type of agent, so we
assume that both types have the same transaction function. Thus, we estimate an aggregate demand
for money.
27The estimated equation is v2
t = 2:68 + 15:64(Rt ¡ 1)=Rt . The t-statistics for the ¯rst and second
coe±cient are 20.82 and 15.72, respectively. The coe±cient of determination is equal to 0.82.
28b ¼
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where b xt denotes the log-linearization of variable xt. This equation resembles the
new Phillips curve derived under Calvo's staggered price setting assumptions. We es-
timate the reduced form of equation (48) using the Generalized Method of Moments.28
The estimator of the marginal costs coe±cient,
("¡1)h
· , is equal to 0:084. Given the
steady state labor supply and the elasticity between di®erentiated goods, the implied
coe±cient for the quadratic cost adjustment is 13:16. This coe±cient is consistent with
a price stickiness of 4 quarters in the Calvo model.29 This estimate is somewhat higher
than the three quarters price stickiness observed in the United States (Sbordone, 2002).
Nevertheless, we carry out a sensitivity analysis to evaluate the robustness of the simu-
lation to di®erent assumptions about price stickiness.
We do not have an estimate of the fraction of the population that is excluded from
asset markets. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finance, Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin (2000) show that in 1989, 59 percent of the U.S. households did not invest
in interest-bearing assets. This amount of asset market segmentation for a developed
economy, suggests that in emerging economies, where capital markets are less developed,
this ¯nancial friction may be more severe. In the baseline calibration we assume an as-
set market segmentation of 50 percent in Chile. Also, we conduct a sensitivity analysis
to analyze how numerical results may change in response to di®erent degrees of asset
market segmentation.30
28We estimate the equation with GMM for the sample period 1990:1 - 2002:4. Instruments used
include four lags of non-tradable in°ation, wage in°ation, real marginal costs, and the non-tradable
output gap.
29In Calvo's model, the reduced form parameters of the expectations augmented Phillips curve are
the same as in the Rotemberg model. Under the Calvo speci¯cation, a fraction µ of the ¯rms cannot
adjust their prices every period. The parameter µ for the Chilean nontradable sector is 0:75. This
number implies an average stickiness of 1=(1¡µ) periods, which in this case corresponds to 4 quarters.
30With the development of private pension funds in Chile and in most Latin American countries, it
is possible to argue that ¯nancial markets are not as segmented as shown in the data since workers
29For transactions with the rest of the world we assume a highly elastic supply of funds
and set º = 0:00001. As argued by Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe (2001), a small elasticity
of the supply of funds schedule reduces °uctuations in the country risk premium. We
calibrate the parameter with a low value in order to not modify the short-run properties
of the model. This implies that the allocations will be approximately the same with or
without the funds schedule. The parameter values are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values for the Chilean Economy
Description Symbol Value
Discount Factor ¯ 0:99
Tradable weight in consumption µ 0:50
Intratemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1
1¡¹ 0:50
Nontradable In°ation Rate ¼N 1:024
Parameter Transaction Cost Function ! 0:06
Parameter Transaction Cost Function » 0:17
Markup "
"¡1 1:20
Price adjustment cost · 13:16
Labor share in the tradable sector ®T 0:40
Elasticity of substitution for tradable ¯rms Á 1:5
Foreign interest rate elasticity º 10¡5
Asset Market Segmentation ¸ 0:5
We assume that the exogenous processes in the model economy follow an AR(1)
process. First, we remove a linear trend from non-tradable labor productivity, tradable
labor productivity, and government expenditure.31 Then, we ¯t the detrended variables
are forced to save for retirement. However, the asset market segmentation considered in this model is
with respect to liquid assets. The portfolio of a pension fund can be converted into cash only after the
retirement period.
31All the variables are expressed in logarithm.




































G); ¾G = 0:026 (51)
(0:10)
4.2 Impulse Responses
In this section we compare the dynamics of the optimal policy against three simple rules:
Non-tradable in°ation targeting, money peg and exchange rate peg. Formally, we de¯ne










In sum, we set the growth rate of a nominal target equal to the steady state non-
tradable in°ation rate. In practice, it is di±cult for a Central Bank to implement an
optimal policy, since it must react contemporaneously to the realization of shocks in the
economy. In order to draw a clear policy prescription from the analysis we compare the
performance of the Ramsey solution against simple monetary policy rules. The result
we ¯nd is surprisingly robust: for any shock in the economy, the optimal policy is quan-
titatively similar to a non-tradable in°ation targeting rule. A model economy with this
rule implies that the non-tradable price level is constant over every period and state
of nature. In turn, this policy undoes all of the costs associated with price stickiness.
Under this policy, the monetary authority eliminates all incentives of the ¯rms to change
their prices in response to shocks. Hence, this policy rule replicates the °exible price
allocation.
The similarity between the allocations of the Ramsey policy and the non-tradable
in°ation targeting rule reveals that undoing the price stickiness in the nontradable sector
is by far the policy with the greatest impact on the household welfare. However, the
Ramsey allocation also reduces to some extent the monetary distortions in the model
economy. Compared to the non-tradable in°ation targeting regime, the social planner
smooths the response of the nominal interest rate which in turn mitigates money distor-
tions operating in the economy. Below we examine the impulse response functions for
each individual shock.
The Balassa-Samuelson e®ect holds in the model, hence the real exchange rate appre-
ciates in response to an increase in productivity in the tradable sector. The productivity
32shock induces a reduction of the marginal cost of the tradable sector ¯rms and gener-
ates a decrease in the relative price of tradable goods. Under sticky prices, a speci¯c
monetary policy can a®ect the dynamics of the economy. Depending on the reaction of
the money supply to the productivity shock, a real appreciation can be achieved either
with an increase in non-tradable prices or with an appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. Figure 1 shows that the dynamics under the optimal policy are very similar to
the one obtained with a non-tradable in°ation targeting rule. This result implies that
at the Ramsey allocation, the non-tradable price is stabilized and the nominal exchange
rate absorbs the real shock. The optimal response to a 1 percent increase in tradable
productivity is a real appreciation of the exchange rate by 1 percent, which is achieved
almost entirely by a decrease in the nominal exchange rate. Other policy rules induce
°uctuations in the non-tradable price that imply a loss of nontradable resources which
reduce welfare. The nominal interest rate consistent with the °exible price allocation is
highly volatile. In response to a 1 percent productivity shock, the nominal interest rate
rises by 110 basis points. Nevertheless, compare to the non-tradable in°ation targeting
regime, the optimal policy smooths the nominal interest rate to reduce the money dis-
tortions associated with transaction costs.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of consumption and labor for traders and non-
traders. We can see that deviations of the Ramsey allocations from the non-tradable
in°ation targeting rule are quantitatively small. The consumption of tradable and non-
tradable goods tend to move together for both types of agents due to the value of
the elasticity of intratemporal substitution. For the calibrated elasticity, agents in the
economy have a higher aversion to intratemporal substitution compared to intertempo-
ral substitution. This speci¯cation generates co-movement between the types of goods
among agents.
The two types of agents have di®erent consumption and labor supply volatilities. The
33volatility of consumption is a®ected by the di®erence in access to ¯nancial markets. The
traders, who have the possibility to trade bonds with the rest of the world, can smooth
consumption over time as opposed to non-traders. In a context of ¯nancial autarky, the
best response of nontraders is to smooth labor supply to minimize welfare losses. Given
that they are unable to smooth consumption over time, they try to smooth as much as
possible leisure. In the case of the traders, they have the possibility to choose an optimal
combination of consumption and leisure given their access to ¯nancial markets. Hence,
access to international capital markets implies a highly volatile labor supply and a low
volatility of consumption under all policies.
The Balassa-Samuelson e®ect also operates when the economy is bu®eted by a pro-
ductivity shock in the non-tradable sector. Figure 3 shows that, under the optimal
policy, a 1 percent increase in non-tradable productivity entails a depreciation of the
real exchange rate by approximately 0.4 percent. Also, in this case, the optimal policy
is characterized by the stability of the non-tradable price and a tendency to smooth
the nominal interest rate. Overall, compared to the previous case, the non-tradable
productivity shock leads to a lower volatility of nominal variables. Figure 4 describes
the dynamics of labor and consumption for both agents. The particular dynamics for
each type of agent are in°uenced by the asymmetry in the access to ¯nancial markets.
In this case the traders have low consumption volatility and high labor volatility, while
the converse is true for non-traders.
Figure 5 and 6 shows the response of the main macroeconomic variables to a shock in
government expenditure. As Perri (2001) pointed out, the real e®ects of ¯scal shocks tend
to be lessened in a small open economy. In the present model, we ¯nd that this demand
shock generates a nil e®ect on real activity. There are no signi¯cant di®erences among
the evaluated policies in response to a 1 percent increase in non-tradable government
expenditure.
344.3 Second Moments and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we carry out a simulation to study the business cycles properties of the
model economy. We abstract from any spillover e®ects among the productive sectors
or any covariance between the exogenous shock processes. We put into perspective the
quantitative predictions of the model, and we compare the standard deviations of the
simulated data to those of the Chilean economy for the period 1990:1 - 2002:4.
The simulations shown in table 2 reveal the same result as before: the dynamics of
the optimal policy resemble those of the non-tradable in°ation targeting regime. When
we evaluate the dynamics for each type agent, we ¯nd that the optimal policy minimizes
the consumption and labor supply volatility of non-traders. For the case of traders, we
¯nd that for most regimes there is a tradeo® between consumption volatility and labor
supply volatility. Considering that traders have access to ¯nancial markets, they have
the ability to insure themselves against a particular monetary policy, and hence the
possibility to choose an optimal combination of consumption and labor for each regime.
Conversely, non-traders do not have this opportunity, and suboptimal policy regimes
induce a ine±cient combination of consumption and leisure.
At the aggregate level, we ¯nd that consumption volatility for most of the regimes is
relatively low compared to the data. This excessive smoothness of consumption is due
to the fact that there is a high negative correlation between the consumption of traders
and nontraders, which decreases the volatility of aggregate consumption. In contrast,
aggregate output under the optimal policy is slightly more volatile than what is found
in the data. This is because in the model labor is highly volatile, due to labor supply
decisions made by traders.
The next question we ask is how these results change in response to di®erent assump-
35Table 2: Standard deviations under alternative policies (1990:1-2002:4)
Variables Data Optimal Nontradable Money Exchange
Policy In°ation T. Peg Rate Peg
Nom. Interest Rate 0.718 0.573 0.637 0.365 0.000
Nontradable In°ation 0.903 0.053 0.000 0.293 0.419
Nom. Dep. Rate 3.069 1.892 1.931 1.106 0.000
Money Growth Rate 3.666 2.082 2.635 0.000 2.976
Aggr. Consumption 3.660 0.770 0.857 0.678 1.649
Aggr. Output 2.447 1.956 2.118 2.612 4.293
Real Exchange Rate 3.555 1.963 1.937 1.338 0.737
Labor Supply 1.227 2.614 2.813 3.717 5.997
Cons. Traders 1.140 1.171 0.739 0.303
Cons. Nontraders 1.486 1.637 1.938 3.393
Labor Traders 5.041 5.385 6.641 9.824
Labor Nontraders 0.571 0.650 1.042 2.477
tions regarding price stickiness and asset market segmentation. In ¯gure 7, we plot the
volatility of the in°ation rate at the optimal policy for di®erent values of ·. The result
we obtain is that in°ation volatility is near zero for a wide range of parameter values
of price stickiness. Even if we consider a moderate sticky price distortion, it is opti-
mal to stabilize the price level of non-tradable goods. Nevertheless, as we decrease the
parameter ·, the relative importance of monetary distortions becomes greater. Thus,
the optimal policy is redirected to minimize other distortions in the model economy.
Figure 8 shows, that the optimal policy in the context of low price stickiness dampens
the °uctuations of the nominal interest rate, which mitigate money distortions.
Figure 9 and 10 show a similar sensitivity analysis for di®erent levels of asset market
segmentation. From this analysis we conclude that stabilizing non-tradable in°ation is
optimal regardless of the ¯nancial structure of the small open economy. Despite the
fact that markets are incomplete for a fraction of the households, the monetary au-
36thority should not sacri¯ce the goal of price stability in order to provide insurance for
the nontraders.32 This result suggests that welfare costs associated to sticky prices are
substantially larger than those generated by asset market segmentation and monetary
transactions. Nevertheless, the nominal interest rate volatility is a®ected by the magni-
tude of asset market segmentation. The intuition for this e®ect is as follows. Since the
optimal policy is always aimed at price stabilization of non-tradable goods, the Ramsey
allocation implies similar paths for money supply for di®erent degrees of asset market
segmentation. However, as asset market segmentation increases, money will be injected
to a smaller mass of traders. The traders get rid of the excess money supply by buying
goods or assets. This process a®ects the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution,
which de¯nes the market interest rate. Hence, when the traders receive a disproportion-
ate money injection, it will increase the volatility of the interest rate.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we characterize the optimal monetary policy for a small open economy
with money distortions, sticky prices, monopolistic competition, and asset market seg-
mentation. Following the Ramsey approach, we have found that in this environment the
optimal policy features a volatility of non-tradable in°ation near zero. This policy lessen
the incentives of non-tradable ¯rms to engage in frequent price adjustment in response to
di®erent shocks, and provides an allocation quantitatively similar to the one that arises
in an economy with °exible prices. Even though a tension exists to undo all distortions
present in the model economy, the optimal policy prioritizes the elimination of sticky
prices over other goals. Using monetary instruments to correct other distortions, such as
asset market segmentation, is highly distortionary in an environment with sticky prices.
These results have two important implications for policymakers. First, an optimal
32The insurance role of monetary policy in an small open economy with asset market segmentation
is discussed by Lahiri et al. (2004).
37monetary policy should target an appropriate price index. Despite the fact that conven-
tional wisdom among policymakers suggests the stabilization of the in°ation rate of the
consumer price index, this policy can be distortionary. The optimal policy should target
only the subset of prices that display stickiness. The empirical evidence33 shows that the
non-tradable sector exhibits more price stickiness than the tradable sector, so stabilizing
a price index that puts more weight on the non-tradable sector is welfare-improving.
Second, stabilizing non-tradable in°ation is optimal regardless of the ¯nancial struc-
ture of the economy. This implication is crucial for developing countries, which have
shallow ¯nancial markets. Even if shallow ¯nancial markets increase the volatility of
consumption, and hence the welfare cost of business cycle °uctuations, it is not optimal
to correct this distortion with monetary policy. A monetary policy aimed at smoothing
consumption is highly distortionary since it implies variations in the non-tradable price,
which in turn generates a loss of resources in the non-tradable sector. One should in-
terpret this result with caution. The fact that correcting asset market segmentation by
monetary means is welfare-reducing does not imply that ¯nancial imperfections should
not be taken into account by policymakers. As an alternative, we may also think in
the possibility of designing an appropriate ¯scal policy to achieve a better intertemporal
allocation. The bene¯ts of using ¯scal instruments to cope with asset market segmen-
tation is an important issue that may be analyzed in the Ramsey policy framework as
well.
There are several dimensions in which we can extend our study. We may include
¯nancial frictions on the supply side such as in the work of C¶ espedes et al. (2004). If
we introduce a credit channel into the model, the higher volatility of nominal interest
rates induced by asset market segmentation would entail higher output volatility. To
the extent that a credit channel may increase the volatility of consumption and leisure,
the optimal monetary policy may deviate from non-tradable price stability in favor of
33See Burstein et al. (2003)
38stabilizing the nominal interest rate. Another extension would be to add two tradable
goods to the model, home and foreign, thereby introducing a role for the terms of trade
in the design of monetary policy. In this context, a monetary authority could manipulate
the terms of trade in favor of consumers. As shown by Faia and Monacelli (2004), this
structure may induce a departure from price stability. The policy implications of these
features can also be evaluated in the Ramsey framework. This public ¯nance approach
to monetary policy has provided useful insights to understand how multiple distortions
should be minimized across time and states of nature.
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426 Appendix A: Lagrangian of the Ramsey Problem
In this appendix, we describe the Lagrangian associated with the Ramsey problem in
section 3. To simplify the arguments of the optimization problem we de¯ne the following
vectors: dt = [cT
t (tr), cN
t (tr), lt(tr), vt(tr), cT
t (tr), cN
t (tr), lt(tr), vt(tr), lT
t , Nt, B¤
t, ¼N
t ]0
and ¹t = [¹1;t;:::;¹11;t]0, where ¹1 - ¹11 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with

























































































































































































































































































































































This can easily be proved rearranging the terms and using the law of iterated expec-
















































































































































































































































































































¡1(nt), v¡1(nt), and ¹5;¡1 = ¹6;¡1 = ¹7;¡1 = ¹8;¡1 = 0.
To see the inclusion of ¹5 - ¹8 as state variables in the characterization of the op-
timal policy, we follow the framework of Marcet and Marimon (1999), expressing this
















































































































































































































































































































t (nt), vt(nt)]0, ¹x
t = [¹5;t, ¹6;t,
¹7;t, ¹8;t]0, and zt = [zT
t , zN
t , gN
t ]0. Additionally, in the text we collect the ¯rst two
vectors in xt = [dx
t, ¹x
t] and the rest of the endogenous variables in vector yt.

















Source: International Financial Statistics. 
Figure 1: Annual In°ation Rate in a sample of six small open economies













Source: International Financial Statistics. 
Figure 2: Financial depth




































































































































































































Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Tradable Sector
























































































































































































Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Tradable Sector (cont.)






































































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Non-tradable Sector






























































































































































































Figure 6: Impulse Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Non-tradable Sector (cont.)



































































































































































































Figure 7: Impulse Responses to a Government Expenditure Shock


































































































































































































Figure 8: Impulse Responses to a Government Expenditure Shock (cont.)





























Figure 9: Non-tradable In°ation Volatility and Price Stickiness




























Figure 10: Nominal Interest Rate Volatility and Price Stickiness





























Figure 11: Non-tradable In°ation Volatility and Degree of Asset Market Segmentation
































Figure 12: Nominal Interest Rate Volatility and Degree of Asset Market Segmentation
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